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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR.
SCHAEFER AND MR. ANDERSON
QUESTION, MR. CHODOSH: Mr. Schafer, in talking about the
different doctrinal alternatives, facts on the one hand versus motive and
purpose, one of the underlying questions is how you define foreign affairs.
You seem to imply a more public conception of foreign affairs, the change to
advance or frustrate a foreign government's policy, especially in the
commercial area. What we have seen is a lot of law and legal activity that is
meant to frustrate private activity or has a devastating effect on private
activity. I would be interested in what your working conception is of foreign
affairs, since that seems to be one of the predicates of whatever kind of
doctrinal solution we come up with.
ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: I agree that the motive or purposes review
is not without problems. I just find it more satisfying than the alternative, the
threshold effects analysis. However, one definition maybe we can start with
is the primary purpose of the state law to change or advance a policy of a
foreign government. I think this captures a lot of what you want to capture
and leaves aside what might be more problematic.
QUESTION, MR. CHODOSH: Just as an example, suppose California
opens its courts to claims against large foreign companies for charges of
slave labor based on state law conceptions of international human rights
norms. What is that? From one point of view, that is a policy that opens its
courts and compensates victims. You have all kinds of things in the
legislative record that will have nothing to do with influencing existing
government. On the other hand, people will see that as a deterrent for future
human rights violations as sending a signal. How do you then categorize that
kind of legislative activity? Where does that fall in your view, even
according to a motive doctrine?
ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: There are always tough hypotheticals.
For example, the Swiss banks situation, with the Holocaust gold. Are you
trying to change the Swiss government's policy, or are you really just trying
to compensate the victims? I am not suggesting that the lines are going to be
easy to draw and I am a little bit hesitant to start taking positions on each
individual case. I would say that I think a strong case is made that there has
to be a Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine. The real question then becomes
what standard or review to use? It is a tough question. There are problems
with motive or purpose. I think the complications are a lot less significant
and a lot friendlier to federalism if we use purpose or motive.
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QUESTION, MR. CHODOSH: Mr. Anderson, I wanted to ask one
question. You talked a lot about the relationships and negotiations between
provincial governments, state governments, foreign governments and
national governments. What about the state-to-state activity of the sub-
federal unit to the sub-federal unit? It seems to me there is a lot of this
activity that is going on, almost beneath the rug of federalist concerns. What
is your view of this?
ANSWER, MR. ANDERSON: There is a fair bit of interaction between
the provinces of Canada and the U.S. states. For example, there are regular
meetings of the Atlantic Premiers with New England Governors. There are
meetings between the provinces and states on the prairies as well. The Great
Lakes area is little less coherent. We just had an announcement that the
Premier of Ontario is going to have an important meeting with the Governor
from New York.
When you actually get into the substance of these interactions, they tend
to spend most of their time talking about general issues as opposed to
specifics. They are not negotiations. There may be an issue that the state
government wants to address with the provincial government. Sometimes
the federal government will get involved. These interactions do not get into
what I would call foreign policy.
QUESTION, MR. HERMAN: I would like to ask a question about is the
increasing power of the Congress and a sense that since Watergate and the
Viet Nam war there has been a diminution of presidential power in foreign
affairs. Is this a long-term trend, whereby the Congress and the committees
of the Congress will increasingly act in foreign affairs, or is this a short-term
phenomenon? Will we see a resurgence of Executive power in the U.S.?
ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: I think there are domestic political forces
behind this trend. More and more citizens are starting to realize international
affairs are starting to affect their everyday lives and they are going to their
Congressman for particular issues. I think you are going to continue to find
the President being put in tough situations where it is his veto threat that will
protect the U.S. from going against its international obligations. Those are
going to be politically difficult and lonely decisions to make at times. On the
state level you may find Governors in the same positions with state
legislators.
QUESTION, MR. BROSCH: Over the last fifty years, the tendency in
international trade agreements has been to move from treaties to
Congressional Executive Agreements. The necessity of Fast Track
legislation arose out of initial defeat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) by the Senate in the early 1950's. Because the Executive
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Agreement has no particular status in the U.S. law, does this tendency allow
for more conflict to arise over these kinds of agreements?
ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: Trade agreements are non-self executing.
Congress approves the agreement and the rest of the bill is changing U.S. law
to come into compliance with the agreement. Subsequently, no one can
bring a claim against the federal government for violating the international
agreement. On the state level there has not really been a conflict yet because
the states have fulfilled the stand still obligation. Conflict may arise when
Canada and the U.S. liberalize or roll back existing levels of state
protectionism. How is the U.S. going to liberalize or roll back existing levels
of state protectionism? Is the U.S. going to use the full extent of its
constitutional power or is the U.S. going to look for some form of consent,
political sign offs from the states? How are the Canadians going to do it?
Are Canadians going to get provincial consent, or are they going to test their
legal powers? Current trade agreements allow the federal government to sue
the state to come into compliance. Nobody else can sue a state. The federal
government ultimately maintains authority to sue a state to come into
compliance.
QUESTION, MR. BROSCH: In that suit, what status does the agreement
itself have?
ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: It would be for conflict of the agreement.
It would not be self-executing. There are a few different ways to
conceptualize it. The statute gives the Executive Branch the right to sue a
state to come into compliance with an agreement. You could say the
implemented act incorporates the agreements into law only for purposes of
that particular type of action. So you can still say it is still non-self
executing. It is just that we incorporated in the U.S. law for that limited
purpose.
QUESTION, MR. JOHNSON: Canada found itself in the circumstance
described this morning. Under a Canada/U.S. agreement, Canada assumed
positive obligations relating to provincial practices. To implement those
obligations, those practices had to change. Canada's implementing
legislation had a section dealing with what would happen if the provinces did
not fall into line. Constitutional challenges were threatened. The provinces
ultimately fell in line on by themselves, so it was not an issue. Had the
challenges been made, the Labor Conventions Case suggests that the federal
government would lose.
Suppose we had that situation in the U.S. with trade agreements,
Congressional Executive agreements assuming positive obligations requiring
specific changes to state law. The state says, "No, we are not going to
change our law." How would that problem be solved?
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ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: I think the key difference is that in
Canada, this problem may be a Constitutional issue depending on the status
of the Labor Conventions Case. In the U.S., it is not a constitutional matter.
The federal government has the constitutional powers to bring the state into
compliance. Realize that even here these new Federalism limits do apply to
Federal Executive Agreements, which is the method that the U.S. uses for
international trade agreements. I am saying those new limits that Mr. Farber
described in the Lopez case and the commandeering cases will not prohibit
federal governments from binding states to obligations on international trade
agreements on subsidies, services, investments, etc.
QUESTION, MR. MACH: Mr. Anderson, the U.S. history on these sort
of international discussions tends to be legalistic, to be legislative and to use
the courts to resolve issues. In Canada we have had a much longer tradition
of trying to use federal provincial agreements to develop consensus on areas
and develop procedures to deal with issues that affect everybody. Canada
has hundreds of various types of federal provincial agreements; minute ones,
ordinary ones, ones covering very substantial areas of Canada, ones on
internal trade and the social framework that provide an overall umbrella for
governmental interaction and social policy. Given the areas you have
identified as probably being most challenging in the future, international
environmental and international trade, where there will be the need for
greater federal provincial involvement? Do you think it is time for federal
provincial agreements on how the provinces will be involved in international
and environmental trade discussions?
ANSWER, MR. ANDERSON: There is an important difference between
Canadian and U.S. federalism. Canada has what we call Executive
Federalism. Canada has the ability at the federal level and the provincial
level to engage one another to enter into agreements and do a lot of things
that are at different levels of formality in terms of the nature of understanding
as well to carry on dialogue. Within the United States, the way the states
relate to Washington is very different. The U.S. tends to work much more
through a very diffuse political system. Canadian provinces tend to be more
structured and formal in their approach to these issues. Whether Canada
would benefit as we move forward on these issues of environment and trade
and having a more formal understanding, I do not know. I think the federal
government explained quite clearly to the provinces our approach on the
issue of how we manage trade. The procedures are well known. There are a
few little areas where there are some questions about how we actually
manage this type of dispute. There have been one or two inconsistencies.
There are clearly some areas where the provinces have a different view from
the federal government. Is there a basis for an agreement? I think that is a
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fair question. There certainly was no basis for an agreement in the 1980's
when the provinces wanted to have negotiators take their instruction from the
federal government and the provinces. I cannot imagine the federal
government conceding on that core issue. The same issues are quite similar
in the area of environment. The environment is a much less settled area of
law. There are more ways to skin the environmental cat than a trade cat.
Some of the things that will be interesting to watch over the years are the
instruments that become the key instruments to deal with international
environmental issues.
QUESTION, MR. ABRAHAMS: Mr. Schaefer, in reference to an earlier
question posed to you about the diminution of presidential powers since
Watergate and Viet Nam through the Congress, do you see an early timetable
or do you see any timetable at all for resurrection of Fast Track Authority for
the President to negotiate trade treaties?
ANSWER, MR. SCHAEFER: The same problems remain. The debate
over environment and labor and how to treat them in trade agreements have
basically ended Fast Track since 1995. The President has been without it for
six years. That same controversy, that same dispute, remains to be solved
and eventually people of good will are going to have to come to some
reasonable resolution.
Here is the problem. The U.S, since the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), has not entered into any regional agreement, with the
exception of Jordan recently, that has not been subject to approval.
Meanwhile, the European Union, Canada and other nations have been
cutting fair trade deals. The result is that U.S. companies are falling behind
in market access, vis' a vis' access in all these markets. The other problem is
that when you do not have a somewhat active or credible regional policy and
other countries are using it to gain ground, it doesn't give an incentive for the
World Trade Organization (WTO) processes to move forward either.
Eventually, one would think the economics of it are going to suggest that we
are going to have to come to some reasonable resolution of these issues.
COMMENT, MR. CHODOSH: With that, I want to thank you both very
much.
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